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Abstract Railway transport consists of two main asset classes of infrastructure and rolling stock. To date, there has
been a great deal of interest in the study and analysis of failure mechanisms for railway infrastructure
assets, e.g. tracks, sleepers, bridges, signalling system, electrical units, etc. However, few attempts have
been made by researchers to develop failure criticality assessment models for rolling stock components. A
rolling stock failure may cause delays and disruptions to transport services or even result in catastrophic
derailment accidents. In this paper, the potential risks of unexpected failures occurring in rolling stock are
identified, analysed and evaluated using a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis-based approach.
The most critical failure modes in the system with respect to both reliability and economic criteria are
reviewed, the levels of failure criticality are determined and possible methods for mitigation are provided.
For the purpose of illustrating the risk evaluation methodology, a case study of the Class 380 train’s door
system operating on Scotland’s railway network is provided and the results are discussed. The data
required for the study are partly collected from the literature and unpublished sources and partly gathered
from the maintenance management information system available in the company. The results of this study
can be used not only for assessing the performance of current maintenance practices, but also to plan a
cost-effective preventive maintenance (PM) programme for different components of rolling stock.
Keywords (separated by '-') Railway rolling stock - Failure mode - Effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) - Risk evaluation -
Preventive maintenance (PM)
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8 Abstract Railway transport consists of two main asset
9 classes of infrastructure and rolling stock. To date, there
10 has been a great deal of interest in the study and analysis of
11 failure mechanisms for railway infrastructure assets, e.g.
12 tracks, sleepers, bridges, signalling system, electrical units,
13 etc. However, few attempts have been made by researchers
14 to develop failure criticality assessment models for rolling
15 stock components. A rolling stock failure may cause delays
16 and disruptions to transport services or even result in
17 catastrophic derailment accidents. In this paper, the
18 potential risks of unexpected failures occurring in rolling
19 stock are identiﬁed, analysed and evaluated using a failure
20 mode, effects and criticality analysis-based approach. The
21most critical failure modes in the system with respect to
22both reliability and economic criteria are reviewed, the
23levels of failure criticality are determined and possible
24methods for mitigation are provided. For the purpose of
25illustrating the risk evaluation methodology, a case study of
26the Class 380 train’s door system operating on Scotland’s
27railway network is provided and the results are discussed.
28The data required for the study are partly collected from
29the literature and unpublished sources and partly gathered
30from the maintenance management information system
31available in the company. The results of this study can be
32used not only for assessing the performance of current
33maintenance practices, but also to plan a cost-effective
34preventive maintenance (PM) programme for different
35components of rolling stock. 6
37Keywords Railway rolling stock  Failure mode  Effects
38and criticality analysis (FMECA)  Risk evaluation 
39Preventive maintenance (PM)
401 Introduction
41The railway transport sector is a key enabler of economic
42growth worldwide. The United Kingdom (UK) has a rail-
43way network of 17,732 km of track (the 17th largest in the
44world) which is spread over wide geographical areas
45throughout the country [1]. The number of railway pas-
46sengers as well as freight volumes has increased signiﬁ-
47cantly in recent years. According to recent statistics
48published by the Ofﬁce of Rail and Road (ORR), a total of
491.654 billion journeys were made in 2014–2015, making
50the UK’s railway network the ﬁfth most used in the world
51[2]. The growth of journeys is partly attributed to a shift
52away from private motoring due to increasing road










A11 1 Department of Mechanical Engineering, School of
A12 Engineering and Built Environment, Glasgow Caledonian
A13 University, Glasgow, UK
A14 2 Cranﬁeld University, College Road,
A15 Bedfordshire MK43 0AL, UK
A16 3 GIPSA-lab, Universite´ Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
A17 4 GIPSA-lab, CNRS, Grenoble, France






Journal : Large 40864 Dispatch : 29-9-2016 Pages : 18
Article No. : 43
h LE h TYPESET



























53 congestion, but also to the improved quality of railway
54 transport services. The British railway industry was pri-
55 vatised over the period 1994–1997, but nowadays most of
56 the railway tracks are managed by Network Rail (NR) [3].
57 Nevertheless, the network is still confronted with serious
58 problems caused by premature failure of assets that require
59 costly and time-consuming maintenance work.
60 The railway assets in general can be categorised into
61 two types: The ﬁrst one is the infrastructure which consists
62 of ﬁxed assets such as tracks, points and interlocking,
63 bridges, signalling system, electrical units, etc. The other
64 one is the rolling stock which includes assets that can move
65 on railway, e.g. locomotives, passenger coaches, freight
66 cars. A rolling stock is a multi-component system that
67 consists of wheels, bogies, doors, power unit, brake control
68 unit, coupler, compressor, pantograph, etc. Figure 1 illus-
69 trates the major components of a British Class 800 rolling
70 stock asset and their relationships to one another. A failure
71 of any of rolling stock components can cause a complete
72 failure of the system and consequently lead to trafﬁc delays
73 and disruptions, passenger inconvenience and economic
74 losses for train operating companies. Rolling stock failures
75 may also result in the derailment of waggons and casualties
76 of passengers and crew. For these reasons, it is crucial to
77 develop practical methodologies for analysing and miti-
78 gating the risks associated with failure of various rolling
79 stock components at a system level.
80 In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid to
81 the study of the failure/damage mechanisms for railway
82 infrastructure assets. However, few attempts have been
83 made by researchers to develop failure criticality
84assessment models for rolling stock components. There are
85several tools and techniques that are currently used to
86determine and evaluate the risk of failures occurring in
87engineering systems throughout their entire life cycle—
88from design to production, operation and maintenance. One
89of the widely used techniques in this regard is the failure
90mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) which is an
91extended version of the failure mode and effects analysis
92(FMEA) method [4, 5]. In the FMECA technique, all
93potential failure modes that could occur in various com-
94ponents of a system are systematically analysed. The
95causes of each failure mode and their associated impact on
96system operation are identiﬁed. A ‘‘risk’’ or ‘‘criticality’’
97measure is then calculated for each failure mode based on
98the rate of occurrence of failure and severity of the possible
99consequences. Finally, the failure modes are prioritised or
100classiﬁed according to their levels of criticality and some
101preventive actions are proposed to improve the reliability
102of the system.
103In this paper, the potential risks of unexpected failures
104occurring in rolling stock are identiﬁed, analysed and
105evaluated using a FMECA-based approach. The criticality
106of a failure is measured as the product of the likelihood of
107occurrence of the failure mode (O) and the severity of
108damage caused by the failure (S), where O and S are
109allocated numbers from 1 to 10. According to criticality
110levels ranging from 1 (lowest) to 100 (highest), the most
111critical failure modes in the rolling stock with respect to
112both reliability and economic criteria are identiﬁed.
113Finally, several potential protective measures to eliminate
114the root causes of rolling stock failures are provided. The
Fig. 1 Railway rolling stock components (www.hitachirail-eu.com)
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115 presented model is applied to a rolling stock passenger
116 door system in a Scottish train operating company and the
117 results are discussed.
118 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
119 Section 2 gives a brief overview of the risk evaluation in
120 the railway industry. Section 3 presents a FMECA
121 methodology for risk evaluation of rolling stock failures. In
122 Sect. 4, a case study of the passenger train door system is
123 described and the results are presented in detail. Finally,
124 the paper is concluded in Sect. 5.
125 2 Risk Assessment in the Railway Industry
126 As stated in ISO 31000:2009 [6], risk is deﬁned as ‘‘the
127 effect of uncertainty on objectives’’ and an effect is ‘‘a
128 positive or negative deviation from what is expected’’. In
129 general, risk is a combination of two factors: (i) the
130 probability of occurrence of a failure and (ii) the magnitude
131 of the consequences of the failure.
132 Risk analysis is deﬁned as a systematic use of available
133 information to characterise the likelihood that a speciﬁc
134 event may occur and the impact of its likely consequences.
135 The purpose of risk analysis is to determine the overall
136 priority of a hazard, so that further actions can be taken to
137 reduce and mitigate the most critical ones where resources
138 are limited. Risk analysis can be either qualitative or
139 quantitative or a combination of both. The qualitative risk
140 evaluation methods use the judgement and opinions of
141 knowledgeable experts to categorise the risks, while
142 quantitative tools are based on probabilistic and/or statis-
143 tical models that calculate risk over time. Typically,
144 quantitative risk assessment techniques are more robust
145 than the qualitative ones. However, the data requirements
146 for quantitative risk assessment techniques are higher,
147 which makes them difﬁcult to apply.
148 In the last decade, many studies have been carried out to
149 analyse the likelihood of failure of railway assets as well as
150 to evaluate the impact of a failure on transport operations.
151 Several risk assessment tools and techniques have been
152 used for this purpose, including root cause analysis (RCA),
153 fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA), Wei-
154 bull analysis, human reliability assessment (HRA), etc. In
155 what follows, we brieﬂy review the most relevant, recent
156 works on the subject below.
157 Haile [7] identiﬁed the strengths and weaknesses of the
158 quantitative risk analysis (QRA) technique in application to
159 railway system design and operation. Carretero et al. [8],
160 Garcia Marquez et al. [9] and Pedregal et al. [10] used a
161 Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) methodology for
162 failure analysis of railway infrastructure assets. Podoﬁllini
163 et al. [11] developed a model to calculate the risks and
164 costs associated with inspection of railway tracks. Zio et al.
165[12] proposed a risk-informed approach for improving the
166service level of railway networks as well as maintaining
167high standards of safety. Their approach uses importance
168measures to identify those sections of the network having
169the highest impact on the overall trains’ delay. Kumar
170et al. [13] developed an approach for risk assessment of
171railway defects that can be used to support the decision-
172making process for scheduling of railway inspection and
173grinding activities based on the type and the risk of
174defect. Macchi et al. [14] presented a two-stage method-
175ology for maintenance management of the railway
176infrastructures. The ﬁrst step of this methodology consists
177of a family-based approach for the equipment reliability
178analysis and the second step builds a reliability model for
179the railway system in order to identify the most critical
180items. Cheng et al. [15] applied the FMECA method to
181analyse the reliability of metro door systems. Kim and
182Jeong [16] used the FMECA method to evaluate the
183consequences of brake system failure in a railroad vehicle
184and then analysed the adequacy of preventive mainte-
185nance (PM) programmes for the asset. Recently, Rahbar
186and Bagheri [17] presented a framework to evaluate the
187risks associated with moving hazardous materials (haz-
188mat) by rail transport.
189As the review shows, very few studies assessing the
190criticality of railway rolling stock component failures and
191the subsequent impacts on infrastructure services have
192been conducted so far. In what follows, we propose a
193FMECA-based methodology to determine the criticality
194level of failures occurring in rolling stock assets.
1953 FMECA Methodology to Rolling Stocks
196The proposed methodology for risk evaluation of rolling
197stock failures, as shown in Fig. 2, includes nine steps.
198These steps are described in detail as follows:
199Step 1 Select a rolling stock component for the study
200A railway rolling stock is usually composed of two main
201parts, namely car body and bogie parts, each consisting of
202different components and each performing certain essential
203function(s). The main rolling stock components that can be
204considered for risk analysis study include (but not limited
205to) the following:
206– Door unit The train doors are ‘‘opened and ‘‘closed’’ at
207each station to allow passengers to enter or leave the
208coach.
209– Scroll compressor It is a certain type of compressor
210used for HVAC and brake systems to compress air.
211– Bogie It is a framework carrying either four or six
212wheels attached to the coaches.
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213 – Pantograph It is a device mounted on the roof of the
214 train to collect electric current from overhead lines.
215 – Coupling system A coupler is a device used for
216 connecting rolling stocks in a train.
217 – Braking unit It is used in order to decrease velocity of
218 trains, enable deceleration, control acceleration and
219 keep them ﬁx when parked.
220 – Air spring suspension It gives a better ride and the
221 pressure can be adjusted automatically to compensate
222 for additions or reductions in passenger loads.
223 – Heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) It
224 provides ﬂuid air through the facility providing either
225 hot or cool air dependent on the desired temperature.
226 Step 2 Collect the component function information
227 As each of the components’ functions in rolling stock is
228 different, the mechanism of the occurrence of failure will
229 be different from one component to another. The risk
230 analysts must have a good understanding of the compo-
231 nents of the system and the way in which they interact with
232 each other and with their surrounding environment. The
233 component function information can be collected by
234 answering some of the following questions:
235 – What functions does the component perform?
236– Can rolling stock operate without this component?
237– Does the component contain redundancies or backups?
238– Will rolling stock fail if the component fails?
239– In which ways will the component affect the other
240components or the overall system?
241In order to deﬁne the logical interaction of components
242within the rolling stock, a Reliability Block Dia-
243gram (RBD) can be useful. An RBD is a diagrammatic
244method for showing how components’ reliability con-
245tributes to the success or failure of a complex system. Each
246block represents a component of the system with a certain
247probability of failure or failure rate. The blocks are often
248conﬁgured (i.e. interconnected) in series structure, parallel
249structure, k-out-of-n structure, etc. [18]. In a series struc-
250ture, the entire system will fail if one of the components
251fails. A parallel structure is used to show redundancy
252wherein the whole system can function properly as long as
253at least one component is working properly. For k-out-of-
254n structures, a system is considered functioning if at least
255k out of a total of n components are working properly
256(1\ k\ n). As an example, the RBD of a railway train
257passenger door system is shown in Fig. 3.
258Step 3 Determine potential failure modes that can cause
259damage to the component through reviewing past failures
2. Collect the component function information 
3. Determine potential failure modes that can cause 
damage to the component 
4. Identify root causes that contribute to failure of 
the rolling stock component
5. Assign a likelihood rating to 
each failure mode 
6. Assign a severity rating to 
each failure mode 
7. Evaluate the criticality level of a rolling stock 
failure and prioritize the failure modes 
8. Categorize the failure modes into five classes of 
criticality
1. Select a rolling stock component for the 
study 
9. Propose potential protective measures to prevent 
recurrences
Fig. 2 Risk evaluation
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260 The identiﬁcation of potential failure modes is an
261 important part of the risk analysis studies. For each com-
262 ponent chosen, there exist some failure modes that can be
263 determined by reviewing past failures, inspection records
264 and non-destructive testing (NDT) measurements. The
265 major failure modes in rolling stock components include
266 disconnection, fracture, fatigue, cracked, degraded,
267 deformed, stripped, worn, corroded, binding, leaking,
268 buckled, sag, loose, misalignment and obstruct. Any of
269 these failure modes or their combination can cause rolling
270 stock to fail. For some rolling stock components, more than
271 one failure mode may be present.
272 Step 4 Identify root causes that contribute to failure of
273 the rolling stock component through interviewing experts
274 from various ﬁelds
275 After all the failure modes have been identiﬁed, the risk
276 analysts begin to investigate what, how and why a failure
277 happened, thus preventing recurrence. The failure root
278 causes can be determined by interviewing experts includ-
279 ing designers, train operators, inspectors, maintenance
280 technicians, etc. and using some analytical techniques like
281 Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and Fault-Tree Analysis
282 (FTA) [19]. RCA is a useful process that helps analysts
283 identify and understand the initiating causes of a failure.
284 FTA is a top-down and deductive failure analysis method
285 through which all undesired events that may lead to system
286 failure are analysed.
287 Some common root causes of the rolling stock failures
288 are electrical/mechanical overloading, installation failure,
289 software failure, hardware failure, material defects are
290 calibration errors. It is worth mentioning that more than
291 one failure cause (known as competing risks) may be found
292 for some failure modes of the rolling stock.
293 Step 5. Assign a likelihood rating to each failure mode of
294 the rolling stock component
295 The failure data are analysed using statistical techniques
296 (e.g. Weibull analysis, regression models, data mining) to
297 create models for estimation of the likelihood of rolling
298 stock defects. The likelihood of occurrence of a failure is
299 evaluated on the basis of failure rates (in year) estimated
300 from historical data or expert knowledge. The failure rate
301 of the failure mode i is estimated by
ki¼
Total number of failures resulting mode i since installation time
Duration of time (in years) operation
:
ð1Þ
303Based on the failure rates obtained, a likelihood of
304occurrence rating based on a 10-point scale is assigned to
305each failure mode (see Table 1). As shown, the recom-
306mended likelihood rating scale varies from 1 to 10, where 1
307represents ‘‘remote’’ and 10 indicates ‘‘almost certain’’.
308Step 6 Assign a severity (consequence) rating to each
309failure mode of the rolling stock component
310Each of the possible failure modes on rolling stock
311components has different impacts on train safety, transport
312operations as well as the environment. The failure conse-
313quences of a rolling stock component can be addressed
314from the following points of view throughout the service
315life-cycle:
316– Economic impacts Costs of inspection, maintenance
317and renewal (IMR), and penalty charges due to train
318delays or cancellation;
319– Social impacts Passengers’ dissatisfaction caused by
320service interruptions;
321– Safety impacts Fatalities or injuries due to train
322derailment;
323– Environmental impacts Greenhouse damages, chemical
324spills, etc.
325In this study, the severity of failure is evaluated in terms
326of economic, social and safety losses and is described on a
32710-point scale where 1 represents ‘‘no effect’’ and 10
328indicates ‘‘dangerous without warning’’. The recommended
329severity rating scale is presented in Table 2.
330Step 7 Evaluate the criticality level of a rolling stock
331failure and prioritise the failure modes in descending order
Fig. 3 A reliability block diagram for the rail train passenger door system
Table 1 Likelihood ratings for a failure in railway rolling stock
Rate Likelihood Criteria Failure rate (/year)
1 Remote Failure is unlikely to occur 1 in 1500,000
2 Very low Very few failures occur 1 in 150,000
3 Low Few failures occur 1 in 15,000
4 Moderate Failures occur occasionally 1 in 2000
5 1 in 400
6 1 in 80
7 High Failures occur frequently 1 in 20
8 1 in 8
9 Very High Failures occur persistently 1 in 3
10 1 in 2
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332 The criticality level of a rolling stock failure is deﬁned
333 by a risk factor (R) which is calculated by multiplying the
334 likelihood rating (O) by the impact rating (S), i.e.
R ¼ O S: ð2Þ
336 Since the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of
337 damage have rating values between 1 and 10, the risk
338 factor R will range from 1 to 100. The risk factors obtained
339 for all failure modes are prioritised in descending order and
340 the most critical ones with respect to both reliability and
341 damage severity are identiﬁed. The most critical failure
342 modes will be the ones occurring most frequently and
343 leading to largest losses.
344 Step 8. Categorise the failure modes into ﬁve classes of
345 criticality
346 The failure modes according to the level of their criti-
347 cality are categorised into ﬁve classes, namely very low,
348 low, medium, high and very high critical. These classes of
349 failure criticality and the associated improvement actions
350 are described in Table 3. A failure mode will be very low
351 critical when its risk factor is between 1 and 4, will be low
352 critical when the risk factor is between 5 and 9, will be
353medium critical when the risk factor is between 10 and 25,
354high critical when its risk factor is between 26 and 49, and
355very high critical when the risk factor is between 50 and
356100.
357Obviously, the criticality classes deﬁned in Table 3 can
358vary depending on the type of rolling stock, available
359maintenance resources, safety standards, railway opera-
360tions, trafﬁc density, train speed, etc. The completed crit-
361icality matrix provides a useful, graphical portrayal of the
362risk factors obtained from the analysis. Different regions of
363the criticality matrix represent different levels of criticality
364for rolling stock components. For example, as shown in
365Fig. 4, the red cells at the top right-hand corner of the
366matrix represent ‘‘very high critical’’ region, whilst the
367green cells at the bottom left-hand corner represent ‘‘very
368low critical’’ region.
369Step 9. Propose potential protective measures to prevent
370recurrences
371In order to achieve an acceptable level of criticality and
372enhance the reliability of the system, some improvement
373actions need to be proposed or initiated for medium, high
374and very high critical failure modes and components.
Table 2 Severity ratings for a failure in railway rolling stock
Rating Effect Criteria Severity of effect
1 None No disruption No effect
2 Very minor Minor disruption to rail services An inspection is carried out. Failure is noticed by few
passengers
3 Minor An inspection is carried out. Failure is noticed by average
passengers
4 Very low An inspection is carried out. Failure is noticed by most of
the passengers but it does not discomfort them
5 Low Some disruption to rail services A repair action is necessary. Failure is noticed by most of
the passengers and they experience some discomfort
6 Moderate A repair action is necessary. Failure is noticed by all
passengers and they experience discomfort
7 High A repair action is necessary. Passengers are dissatisﬁed
8 Very high Major disruption to rail services The failed item needs to be replaced by a new one.
Passengers are very dissatisﬁed
9 Dangerous with warning May endanger rolling stock or
passengers
The failure affects transport safety with warning and it
involves noncompliance with regulation
10 Dangerous without warning The failure mode affects transport safety without warning
and it involves noncompliance with regulation
Table 3 Five classes of failure
criticality and the associated
improvement actions
Criticality level Risk Factor (R) Recommendation
Very low 1≤ R ≤ 4 Almost unnecessary to take the improvement actions
Low 5 ≤ R ≤ 9 Minor priority to take the improvement actions
Medium 10 ≤ R ≤ 25 Moderate priority to take the improvement actions
High 26 ≤ R ≤ 49 High priority to take the improvement actions
Very high 50 ≤ R ≤ 100 Absolute necessary to take the improvement actions.
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375 Generally, the following protective measures can be con-
376 sidered to achieve a lower level of risk of failure in railway
377 rolling stocks:
378 • improving the reliability of individual components
379 (parts improvement method);
380 • adding redundancy to critical components in order to
381 increase the mean time between failures (MTBF);
382 • planning and undertaking scheduled cost-effective
383 maintenance activities to minimise interruptions to
384 railway transport services (e.g. see [20]);
385 • utilising sensor-based technologies to continuously
386 monitor the behaviour of rolling stock components; and
387 • minimising the service disruption through shortening
388 the repair lead times [21].
389
390 4 Application to Passenger Door Unit
391 In this section, the proposed risk evaluation model is
392 applied to a passenger door system of the Class 380 electric
393 multiple unit (EMU) that operates on the national railway
394 network in Scotland [22]. The Class 380 trains are some of
395 the newest and most advanced ﬂeets available on the
396 market, which account for around 10 % of the total number
397 of trains operating on Scotland’s railway network. These
398 trains have spacious seating, wide aisles, roof-mounted air
399 conditioning, 230 V power sockets for laptops and hand-
400 held devices under each table, ample luggage provision,
401 dedicated areas for cycles and wheelchairs, and Closed
402 Circuit Television (CCTV) for added security.
403 There are several key components on the Class 380
404 trains that are often far more critical to the functionality
405 of the system than the others. An analysis of performance
406 data indicates that a great number of failures are associ-
407 ated with door system (see Fig. 5), having a detrimental
408 effect on the train reliability and consequentially
409passenger satisfaction. A door system consists of the
410following major components:
411– Door drive Gearbox, upper locking devices, synchro-
412nising cable and guides;
413– Control elements and switches Open/close limit
414switches and pushbuttons;
415– Door leaf Mounting of leaf, window and lead-mounted
416guides;
417– Safety and emergency devices Mechanical switches,
418ﬁnger protection and light barrier;
419– Other components Interior panelling, wiring, lighting
420and steps.
421The data required for this study were collected from the
422literature, the company’s maintenance management soft-
423ware system called EQUINOX and the UK’s railway per-
424formance management software DATASYS BUGLE [23].
425These systems not only monitor all maintenance activities
426carried out by sub-contractors, but also record the trains’
427activities from the operations side of business.
428A ﬂeet of 38 Class 380 trains (including 22 trains with
429four cars and 16 trains with three cars) is considered for
430this study. These trains are in operation since early
431December 2010 and have experienced a total of 2493
432failures within the duration of this study. Of these, 205
433failures (i.e. 8.2 % of the total failures) were related to
434defects associated with door unit components. The total
435mileage that these trains have been in operation is
4362,235,312 miles. Therefore, the mean number of failures
437(MNF) per train and the mean mileage between failures







¼ 58; 824 miles:
Fig. 4 A criticality matrix for rolling stock failures
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440 The ﬁve why’s technique was used to identify the potential
441 failure modes and determine the root causes of failures. An
442 example of the technique applied to the door system is
443 given below:
444 The results of the analysis show that the door defects are
445 due to twelve primary sources (root causes), as illustrated
446 in Fig. 6. These, in order, are given as follows:
447 a. No fault found (NFF) No particular root cause was
448 found for 87 door defects (i.e. 42.4 % of the total door
449 defects reported).
450 b. Faulty push buttons These were found to be the cause
451 of 39 door defects (i.e. 19 % of the total door defects
452 reported).
453 c. Faulty door control unit (DCU) There have been 20
454 failures recorded with failure modes such as internal
455power supply failure, internal obstruction detection
456due to motor voltage and also falshcodes on DCU.
457d. Mechanical failures 18 failures were reported to be in
458relation to actuator rods becoming loose or not
459disengaging from limit switches.
460e. Light barrier There have been seven failures due to
461light barrier.
462f. Door drive There have been 6 failures in relation to
463door drive of the system. These failures are due to
464different reasons such as motor failure, encoder failure
465and faulty connections to the drive system.
466g. Guard operating panel (GOP) six failures were found
467to be due to GOP defects.
468h. Limit switches there have six faults occurred in relation
469to limit or micro-switches on the drive system.
Fig. 6 Failure mode
frequencies for a passenger door
system
Door system on class 380 train does not operate
There is no electrical supply
Miniature circuit breaker (MCB) was found tripped          
Electrical plug which supplied the motor is not fully secured
There is no means of secondary locking on the 40 pin plug 
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470 i. Loose plugs Six failures were found to be due to loose
471 plugs or loose connections within the plugs
472 themselves.
473 j. Obstructions There have been six failures of door
474 obstruction of the door leaves themselves, mostly due
475 to dirt or debris stuck in door tracks.
476 k. Door roller two failures were reported to be due to the
477 rollers becoming detached from housing and not tough
478 due to being damaged.
479 l. Lubrication There have been two failures as a result of
480 poor lubrication on the door system.
481 Table 4 presents the frequency of door system defects
482 occurred in each train due to the above-mentioned 12
483 failure root causes.
484 Qualitative assessment of the severity of different types
485 of door defects was performed based on the negative
486 impacts on transport services in terms of train delays, speed
487 restriction and service cancellation. The delay information
488 was extracted from a database system called TRUST
489 (TRain RUnning SysTem TOPS) that is used for moni-
490 toring the progress of trains and tracking delays on the
491 UK’s railway network. The total delay time of the train due
492 to door defects was 518 min. The train operating company
493 is penalised £50 per minute delay in service. Thus, the total
494 penalty charges due to train delays will be 518 min 9 £50/
495 min = £25900.
496 A Delphi technique was used to elicit the experts’
497 estimates of the failure likelihood and damage severity.
498 Three academics who have published several papers in the
499 ﬁeld of risk and reliability, three maintenance engineers
500 from the operating company with over 15 years of expe-
501 rience, one designer from the design consultancy and one
502 designer from the manufacturer company were involved in
503 this FMECA study. The results of the risk evaluation for
504the rolling stock door system are given in a worksheet
505format in Table 5. As shown, the level of criticality for
506various failure modes ranges from 3 to 28, where less than
507three percent of the failure modes fall into ‘‘very low
508critical’’ category, around 15 % of the failure modes are
509classiﬁed as ‘‘low critical’’, around 70 % of the failure
510modes are ‘‘medium critical’’ and 12 % of the failure
511modes fall into ‘‘high critical’’ category. The high critical
512failure mode includes nine items, of which four failure
513modes have the risk factor of 27 and ﬁve failure modes
514have a criticality of 28 (out of 100). To avoid the recur-
515rence of these failure modes, it is crucial to plan and carry
516out PM actions in a cost-effective and timely manner.
517The Class 380 trains are expected to run 160,000 miles
518per year and to be in operation for 300 days of the year.
519Thus, the average daily miles for each train will be 533
520miles. The current maintenance programme includes ele-
521ven tasks as described in Table 6 [24].
522The current maintenance activities were selected
523according to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM)’s
524recommendations as well as using the experience of other
525ﬂeets. It was found that when previous ﬂeets were intro-
526duced in the UK’s railway network, too much intrusive
527maintenance was undertaken and thus led to excessive
528delays. However, the Class 380 has different doors in the
529sense that they are electrically powered and the older ﬂeets
530have pneumatic operations. The controls of the pneumatic
531system can be adjusted, which was found to cause prob-
532lems, and the technology at time of manufacture was not
533sufﬁcient to ﬁt tamper-proof components. Overall, the
534current maintenance programme is not adequate and in
535order to reduce the number of door-related defects, a new
536PM programme including fourteen tasks has been proposed
537by company’s asset management team (see Table 7).
Table 4 Frequency of door defects in each train due to various root causes
Train Failure root causes Total













1 2 4 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 13
2 7 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
3 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 12
4 4 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
5 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 9
6 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
… … … … … … … … … … … … … …
38 … … … … … … … … … … … … 1
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538By implementing such a PM programme, the reliability
539of the door system will undoubtedly increase as the
540majority of failures can very likely be detected and recti-
541ﬁed with certain mileage-based maintenance tasks at the
542periodicities given. However, a further study will be
543required to assess the performance of the proposed main-
544tenance programme in terms of system availability, service
545reliability and safety and cost of IMR.
5465 Conclusions and Future Work
547In the current study, a failure mode, effects and criticality
548analysis (FMECA)-based approach was presented to
549identify, analyse and evaluate the potential risks associated
550with unexpected failure of rolling stock components. The
551criticality level of a rolling stock failure is calculated by
552multiplying the likelihood of occurrence of the failure
553mode (O) and the severity of damage caused by the failure
554(S), each being rated with a number from 1 to 10
555(1 = lowest, 10 = highest). The failure modes according
556to the level of their criticality were categorised into ﬁve
557classes, namely very low, low, medium, high and very high
558critical. The most critical failure modes in the system with
559respect to both reliability and economic criteria were
560identiﬁed and possible methods for mitigation were
561discussed.
562The analysis model was applied to the passenger door
563unit of a ﬂeet of 38 Class 380 trains operating on Scot-
564land’s railway network. The data required for the analysis



























































































































































































































































9 Table 6 Current maintenance programme for the passenger door
system
Task Task description Mileage
Current maintenance programme
1 Passenger bodyside doors—unit functional check
(via HMI)
16,000
2 Bodyside doors—door functional check 16,000
3 Automatic passenger counting system—sensor
covers clean and inspect
38,800
4 Bodyside doors—examine 51,800
5 Automatic passenger counting system—
detection of height of sensor check.
80,000
6 Bodyside doors—minor lubrication 160,000
7 Bodyside doors—check of painting 160,000
8 Bodyside doors—major lubrication 320,000
9 Bodyside doors—visual inspection 320,000
10 Bodyside doors—check of clearance and
replacement of energy chains
1,553,500
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566 maintenance management software system called EQUI-
567 NOX, the UK’s railway performance management soft-
568 ware DATASYS BUGLE and the UK’s train movements
569 monitoring system called TRUST. The ﬁve why’s tech-
570 nique was used to identify the potential failure modes of
571 door unit components and their root causes, including the
572 defects in relation to pushbuttons, door control unit (DCU),
573 mechanical failures, light barrier, door drive, guard oper-
574 ating panel (GOP), limit switches, loose plugs, obstruc-
575 tions, door roller and lubrication. The results of the risk
576 evaluation showed that the nine failure modes (12 % of the
577 total number of failure modes identiﬁed) are ‘‘high critical’’
578 to door system functionality. The results of this study were
579 used not only for assessing the performance of current
580 maintenance practices, but also to plan a cost-effective
581 preventive maintenance (PM) programme for different
582 components of rolling stock. To avoid the recurrence of the
583 failure modes, a new mileage-based preventive mainte-
584 nance (PM) programme including 14 tasks was proposed.
585 There is a wide scope for future research in the area of
586 risk analysis in relation to railway rolling stock failures.
587 Some of the possible extensions of the present work are as
588 follows:
589 a. proposition of a multiple criteria FMECA approach for
590 risk evaluation of different rolling stock components;
591 b. evaluation of the cost effectiveness of PM programmes
592 for rolling stock with respect to risk evaluations (see
593 [25]);
594 c. development of a more quantitative approach to
595 characterise the likelihood that a rolling stock failure
596 may occur and the impact of likely consequences.
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